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CDM outreach workers approach 
the local government building in 
the town of Magdalena Peñasco, 
located in the Mixteca region of 
Oaxaca.
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RECRUITMENT REVEALED
SELECT KEY FINDINGS 2
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S.  CONGRESS
The U.S. Congress must overhaul the H-2 guestworker programs to protect 
workers from recruitment abuse. Speciﬁcally, Congress must:
ïEnact legislation to hold employers strictly liable for all recruitment 
fees charged to workers.
ïExtend federally funded legal services to all H-2 workers.
ïCreate a public recruiter registry to increase transparency in  
the recruitment process.
ïAmend federal anti-discrimination laws to clearly articulate the 
available protections for internationally recruited workers, both during 
the recruitment process and while employed in the U.S.
ïEnact retaliation protections for workers who report  
recruitment abuse.
ïRequire that all job orders be treated as enforceable contracts.
58% 47%
10%
58% reported paying a recruitment fee.  47% took out a loan to cover pre- 
employment expenses.
52% were not shown contracts. 1 out of 10 reported paying a fee  
for a non-existent job.
1 See Bureau of Consular Aﬀairs 
(U.S. Dep’t of State), Nonimmigrant 
Visa Issuances by Visa Class and by 
Nationality, FY1997-2011 NIV Detail 
Table (undated), http://travel.
state.gov/visa/statistics/nivstats/
nivstats_4582.html. In 2011, 106,210 
temporary workers entered the US 
on H-2A and H-2B visas. Though 
absolute numbers have fluctuated 
over the past decade (due, in part, 
to government-imposed caps on 
the H-2B visa), Mexicans have al-
ways accounted for between 71-83% 
of the total number of individuals 
admitted to the US on H-2A and 
H-2B visas. In fact, that percentage 
has risen: slightly less than 75% 
were from Mexico in 2000, while 
almost 83% of H-2 visa holders 
were from Mexico in 2011. Most 
of that increase occurred from the 
years 2006–2011. 
2 Surveys (on file with CDM). 
Statistics presented in this report 
reflect data gathered through sur-
veys of H-2 workers who worked 
in the U.S. during or after 2006.
52%
Executive Summary
This report reveals the reality of international labor recruitment 
for low-wage, temporary jobs in the United States, examining 
recruitment in Mexico, home to the largest number of temporary 
migrants who labor under H-2 visas in the U.S.1 The ﬁndings are 
based on data gathered by Centro de los Derechos Migrante, Inc., 
(CDM) through a groundbreaking survey and lengthy interviews  
of hundreds of H-2 workers. The report’s key ﬁndings are 
summarized below. 
 
THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FL AWED
1. Employers, recruiters and their agents charge illegal recruitment fees and fail to 
reimburse visa, travel and recruitment-related expenses incurred by workers. 
Despite bans on recruitment fees in both U.S. and Mexican law, it remains standard 
practice in Mexico for recruiters to charge workers for their services. Fifty-eight 
percent of workers surveyed reported paying a recruitment fee to their recruiter. 
The average recruitment fee charged was $590. Regardless of legal precedent 
requiring reimbursement for travel, visa, and recruitment costs that reduce wages 
below the applicable minimum wage, H-2 workers rarely receive reimbursements for 
the often staggering costs they pay for their jobs in the U.S. 
2. Employers, recruiters, and their agents often misrepresent terms of 
employment. Recruiters often make false promises to workers about employment 
conditions in hopes of attracting more workers and charging higher recruitment 
fees. More than half of workers surveyed did not receive a copy of their job 
contract. 
3. Recruitment fraud causes economic harm in migrant communities. The lack  
of transparency in the visa certiﬁcation process, paucity of government oversight 
of recruitment activities, and scarcity of information available to workers about 
their rights puts workers at serious risk for recruitment fraud by con artists posing 
as recruiters, bona ﬁde recruiters and U.S. employers. One out of every 10 workers 
surveyed reported having paid a recruitment fee for a nonexistent job. 
4. Workers arrive to the United States in debt. Many workers take out loans, often at 
high interest rates and using property deeds as collateral. These loans, combined 
with workplace abuses, may lead to situations of forced labor, debt servitude or 
human trafﬁcking. Almost half of all workers surveyed reported borrowing money  
to cover their recruitment costs.
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RECRUITMENT REVEALED
INTRODUCTION
Revealing a System of Flaws
3 See Bureau of Consular Aﬀairs, 
supra note 1.
4 See Identification of Foreign 
Countries Whose Nationals Are 
Eligible to Participate in the H-2A 
and H-2B Nonimmigrant Worker 
Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 2,558-2,559 
(Jan. 18, 2012).
5 See Bureau of Consular Aﬀairs, 
supra note 1.
6 Survey 0108 (on file with CDM).
7 For the purposes of this report, 
CDM will use the word “recruiter” 
to refer to any agency or indi-
vidual that is involved in bringing 
workers to the US with H-2 visas 
for the benefit of themselves or a 
US employer.
Over 100,000 migrant workers are employed in low-wage, 
temporary jobs in the United States on H-2A visas for 
agricultural work and H-2B visas for non-agricultural work 
each year.3 These “guest” workers are contracted by U.S. 
employers to perform grueling work, whether harvesting 
crabs, assembling carnival rides, or cutting lawns, and they 
are paid paltry wages that sometimes do not meet federal 
standards. To maintain their jobs, the workers must meet 
production and work standards that endanger their lives. 
Their employment experience begins at recruitment. 
While employers may recruit workers for H-2 visas from 58 different countries 
in the world,4 the overwhelming majority of individuals who travel to work 
in the U.S. on these visas is from Mexico:5 one such worker is Reynaldo.6
Reynaldo was recruited from a small town in Michoacán to pick tomatoes 
on an H-2A visa in Arkansas. Before leaving Mexico, Reynaldo took out a 
loan to pay the $360 recruitment fee demanded by the recruiter as well 
as the visa fee and travel costs. He was told by the recruiter to lie if asked 
about paying a recruitment fee during his interview at the U.S. Consulate. 
Upon arriving in the U.S., he found the working and living conditions fell 
short of what he was promised. Although he was promised free housing, 
as is required by U.S. regulations for H-2A visas, his employers charged 
him $80 per month for “utilities.” In addition, the living conditions 
were indecent: he and 11 other workers shared a small, one-bathroom 
apartment with a non-functioning kitchen. He worked long, 80-hour work 
weeks and was paid only $7.25 per hour. Upon returning to Mexico he was 
unable to pay back his loan.
Workers like Reynaldo ﬁll a critical role in the U.S. labor market, yet they 
are subject to pervasive mistreatment by employers and recruiters.7 
This mistreatment is enabled by inadequate worker protections and lax 
oversight by the responsible government agencies. A ﬂawed recruitment 
process and lack of worker protections in recruitment facilitate and, 
often, exacerbate many of the abuses that these internationally recruited 
workers may later experience.
A CDM outreach worker leads a 
Know-Your-Rights workshop in  
a small town in Veracruz. 
PHOTO: LILIÁN LÓPEZ GRACIÁN
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A worker displays his H-2B visa. 
The photo has been redacted to 
protect the worker’s identity.
An ofﬁce of the recruitment 
agency Labors Mex USA in Celaya, 
Guanajuato. 
PHOTO: GRACIA CUZZI
During the past decade, U.S. temporary worker programs have received 
heightened attention as politicians and employers have advocated for their 
expansion, while advocates have sought improved oversight and worker 
protections. Many politicians and employers see temporary work programs 
as a crucial component of immigration reform and a potential solution to 
unauthorized migration. Since the 2012 election, Sen. Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) have resurrected their bipartisan 
framework for immigration reform from two years ago, which includes a 
temporary worker program as one of its four pillars.8
In the push for a more convenient and less restrictive temporary worker 
program for employers, the interests of workers have been overlooked. 
This approach builds on a potent myth: that international labor 
recruitment is a win-win solution, beneﬁtting employers and workers alike. 
Instead, the system effectively reduces the costs, liabilities, and legal 
duties of domestic businesses through the sacriﬁce of workers’ safety, 
security and wages. Ignorance of the abuses inside labor recruitment, 
and the role of U.S. law in propagating them, therefore forms a crucial 
component in the ﬂawed public narrative on immigration reform. The 
stories of workers like Reynaldo, and the revealing data therein about the 
recruitment process, disrupt the myth and jeopardize the traction of an 
unfair policy.
This report speciﬁcally aims to shed light on the existing H-2 recruitment 
system, to uncover the principal problems related to this system and to 
provide recommendations for improved oversight, regulation and reform.
Recruitment Revealed relies heavily on extensive outreach, interviews and 
surveys conducted by CDM over the past 5 years. This research produced 
220 lengthy individual surveys with H-2 workers on their recruitment and 
employment experiences in the U.S. Additionally, CDM surveyed migrant 
support organizations, submitted information requests under government 
transparency laws in the U.S. and Mexico, and executed hundreds of 
community outreach trips to collect information on the recruitment 
industry. This information has been systematized in a recruitment database 
maintained and updated by CDM. The report’s conclusions are based on the 
analysis of the research and data collected through this study.
CDM undertook this project, publishing valuable information related to the 
ﬂawed U.S. temporary worker program, which begins with recruitment, 
to educate the public and political leaders about the ﬂaws in the current 
system. This critical information and insight must be considered before any 
measures are taken to expand these programs as part of a comprehensive 
immigration reform package. Failure to ensure a just recruitment system in 
the current or an expanded H-2 program will only exacerbate abuses that 
exist in an already exploitative, dangerous, and broken system. 
8   Dan Friedman, Schumer, 
Graham Resume Immigration Talks, 
The National Journal (Nov. 11, 
2012), http://www.nationaljournal.
com/sunday-shows/schumer-
graham-resume-immigration-
talks-20121111.
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U.S. employers are required to obtain permission from the 
U.S. government to employ internationally recruited workers, 
also referred to as “guest” workers.10 The formal name for the 
permission given by the U.S. government to an employer is 
called a “temporary labor certiﬁcation.”11 Once a U.S. employer 
has received certiﬁcation from the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) for a certain number of H-2A or 
H-2B visas, an employer usually hires labor recruiters to locate 
the workers who will apply for these visas.12 
In general, recruitment is a non-uniform, complex and often 
informal process. Thus, the recruitment supply chain can 
take many different forms. Below is a nonexhaustive list of 
recruitment models utilized in the H-2 visa system: 
ïMODEL 1  Employer-Recruiter (Mexico)-Worker: The U.S. 
employer contracts directly with Mexico-based recruit-
ment agencies.13 The recruiter then locates workers to ﬁll 
the job order. 
ïMODEL 2  Employer-Recruiter (U.S.)-Recruiter (Mexico)-
Worker: The U.S. employer hires a U.S.-based recruiter.  
The U.S.-based recruitment agency subcontracts a Mexico-
based recruitment agency or individuals in Mexico to assist 
them in their efforts.14 
ïMODEL 3  Employer-Recruiter (U.S.)-Recruiter (U.S.)-
Recruiter (Mexico)-Worker: The U.S. employer hires a 
U.S. recruitment agency. The U.S. recruitment agency 
subcontracts a second U.S. recruitment agency. The 
second U.S. recruitment agency subcontracts a Mexico-
based recruitment agency or individuals in Mexico to assist 
with their efforts.15
ïMODEL 4  Employer-Recruiter (U.S.)-Worker: The U.S. 
employer hires a U.S. recruitment agency that then directly 
locates workers to ﬁll the job order.16
ïMODEL 5  Employer-Worker: Some U.S. employers ask  
their temporary migrant workers to recruit for them during 
their annual return to Mexico between seasons.17 
10 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.15(a)(pre-
filing requirements for labor 
certification); see also 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.130(a)(filing requirements 
for labor certification); 20 C.F.R. 
§ 655.101 (process for approving 
certifications).
11   Id.
12 See Oﬃce of Foreign Labor 
Certification (U.S. Dep’t of Labor), 
FY2011 H-2A Labor Certifica-
tions DOL (undated), http://www.
foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/
quarterlydata.cfm. Almost 62% of 
H-2A applications in 2011 listed 
agents who helped them with 
their applications. See also Oﬃce 
of Foreign Labor Certification (U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor), FY2011 H-2B Labor 
Certifications DOL (undated), 
http://www.foreignlaborcert.
doleta.gov/quarterlydata.cfm. Over 
84% of H-2B applications listed 
agents who helped them with 
their applications. Until now, little 
information has been available 
about the recruitment industry. 
See changes to Requirements Af-
fecting H-2B Nonimmigrants and 
Their Employers, 73 Fed. Reg. 78, 
104, 78, 125 (Dec. 19, 2008). In fact, 
even the federal government has 
stated that “DHS has no reliable 
data on the number of firms that 
recruit H–2B employees, but DHS 
research in this area indicates that 
the majority of new, and many 
returning, H–2B employees have 
utilized such a service in their 
home countries.”
13 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1566, 
1668 (on file with CDM).
14 See, e.g., survey numbers: 
0043, 0111, 1560 (on file with 
CDM).
15 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1619, 
0078, 1618, 0108, 1548 (on file with 
CDM).
16 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1624, 
0023, 0090, 0046 (on file with 
CDM).
17 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1416, 
1526, 1554, 0125, 1688, 1638 (on file 
with CDM).
How Does Recruitment Work?
Abuses suffered by temporary workers under the H-2 visa 
programs often begin in the workers’ countries of origin. Most 
workers recruited for H-2 visas are recruited in Mexico.9 A worker’s 
recruitment experience may affect her employment experience 
in the United States, and workers who experience abuse in 
recruitment, often later experience abuse while employed in the 
U.S. with a visa. Despite the importance of recruitment, until now 
the recruitment process has been little studied or understood. 
9 See supra note 1.
RECRUITMENT:  
THE FIRST STEP IN A  
CYCLE OF TEMPORARY 
WORKER ABUSE
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RECRUITER INVOLVEMENT
The level of involvement by labor recruiters in the recruitment 
and migration process also varies widely. Some recruiters 
organize the passport paperwork, the consular appointment, 
travel, and room and board during the process.21 Other 
recruiters simply connect the worker with the employer by 
petitioning for a visa interview at a U.S. consulate in Mexico,  
but leave the worker to arrange all other logistical 
components.22 
Although recruitment fees are prohibited by both Mexican  
and U.S. law,23 recruiters extract fees from workers with 
promises of employment in the U.S.
21 See survey numbers: 1309, 
0085, 0099, 0108, 0124 (on file 
with CDM).
22 See survey numbers: 0136, 
0139, 1530, 1571, 1601 (on file with 
CDM).
23 Ley Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] 
[Federal Labor Law], as amended, 
Artículo 28, 1 de abril de 1970 
(Mex.). For the H-2A visa, federal 
regulations prohibit employers 
from allowing workers to pay 
recruitment costs, employers’ 
attorney or application fees, visa 
fees, and border crossing fees. See 
20 C.F.R. § 655.135(j); 20 C.F.R. § 
655.122(h) (stating that employers 
must reimburse incoming travel 
costs once the worker completes 
50% of the contract period and 
the employer must provide return 
travel free of charge); see also 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(i)(B)(placing 
a ban on recruitment fees in 
the H-2B program); Temporary 
Non-Agricultural Employment of 
H-2B Aliens in the United States, 
77 Fed. Reg. 10,038 (Feb. 21, 2012). 
The new regulations for the H-2B 
program, which would have gone 
into eﬀect on April 27, 2012, would 
also have prohibited recruiters 
and their agents from charging 
fees and would have improved 
transparency in the recruitment 
process. The new regulations are 
currently stayed due to a tempo-
rary injunction issued by a federal 
district court in the Northern 
District of Florida in Bayou Lawn & 
Landscape Services, et al. v. Hilda 
Solis, et al. (3:12-CV-00183-MCR-
CJK). 
The lack of transparency in 
the process obscures worker 
exploitation and shields those 
responsible for the abuse 
from liability. 
1 2 3 4 5
R R
R
R
R
R
In addition to these various recruitment models, sometimes 
U.S. employers, U.S. recruitment agencies or Mexico-
recruitment agencies may employ the assistance of stafﬁng 
agencies to locate workers.18 These stafﬁng agencies “lease” 
workers to other employers.19 At times, lawyers and law ﬁrms 
can also act as recruiters for U.S. employers, sometimes 
directly locating workers for employers, or sometimes 
subcontracting with recruitment agencies or individual 
recruiters.19 
As a result, workers are often confused as to who among the 
recruiters, agents, and visa sponsors actually employs them. 
The lack of transparency in the process obscures worker-
exploitation and shields those responsible for the abuse from 
liability. In sum, the existing recruitment system is an intricate 
web that is often difﬁcult for workers and their advocates  
to untangle.
Employer > Recruiter (mex) > 
Worker
 Employer > Recruiter (US) > 
Recruiter (mex) > Worker
 Employer > Recruiter (US) >  
Recruiter (US) > Recruiter 
(mex) > Worker
 Employer > Recruiter (US) > 
Worker
 Employer > Worker
18 See Complaint at 4-5 and 10, 
Magnifico, et al., v. Villanueva, et 
al., No. 9:10-cv-80771-KLR (S.D. FL 
Mar. 18, 2011); see also, e.g., U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Final Determina-
tion (Redacted) (undated), (on file 
with CDM) (letter denying Dec. 
9, 2010 application requesting 
H-2B temporary labor certification 
submitted by a job contractor). 
19 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Oﬃce, GAO-10-1053, H-2B Visa 
Program: Closed Civil and Criminal 
Cases Illustrate Instances of H-2B 
Workers Being Targets of Fraud and 
Abuse 4 (2010) available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d101053.
pdf (stating that employers and 
recruiters leased additional work-
ers to businesses not on the peti-
tions); see also Press Release, New 
Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial 
Justice, Guestworkers Sue Missis-
sippi Labor Brokers, Expose Cap-
tive Worker Racket (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://nowcrj.org/2009/04/20/
guestworkers-sue-mississippi-
labor-brokers-expose-captive-
workers-racket/ (Recruiters were 
sued for allegedly leasing workers, 
among other violations.); survey 
number: 0073 (on file with CDM).
20 See supra note 12; see also 
survey number: 1582 (on file  
with CDM).
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CASE ST UDY: DEL-AL ASSOCIATES 24
Del-Al Associates is a Texas-based recruitment agency that “places” Mexican 
workers with U.S. employers or recruitment agencies for H-2 visas. Each 
year, Del-Al Associates “places” thousands of Mexican workers with H-2 
employment in the U.S. In 2005, Del-Al Associates provided testimony in a 
class action suit against International Labor Management Corporation, the 
North Carolina Growers Association, and Del-Al Associates, that illustrates 
the informal and complicated nature of the recruitment industry. 
Juan Del Alamo testiﬁed that Del-Al Associates “placed” between 11,000 and 
13,000 Mexican workers per year with North Carolina Growers Association 
(NCGA) and International Labor Management Corporation (ILMC) between 
1998 and 2000.25 NCGA was listed in the Temporary Labor Certiﬁcations as 
an employer, not as a recruiter or an agent. In most certiﬁcations, NGCA 
listed ILMC as its agent. ILMC is a recruitment agency that contracts with 
U.S. employers to locate Mexican workers for H-2 visas. ILMC, in turn, 
subcontracted with Del-Al Associates, which subsequently worked with an 
independent contractor in Mexico. Del-Al Associates’ relationships with both 
NCGA and ILMC were predicated on “oral understandings,” and no written 
agreement or contract existed for either.
In fact, Del-Al Associates did not receive payment from NCGA or ILMC for 
its services. Instead, the entire revenue generated for Del-Al Associates 
through these business transactions was collected in fees from workers by 
the independent contractor in Mexico. Interestingly, Juan Del Alamo insists 
that his company is not a recruitment agency because only the independent 
contractor has direct contact with workers and is neither an employee nor 
an “agent” of Del-Al Associates. At the same time, these “independent” 
contractors used business cards embossed with the words “Del Al Associates, 
Inc.” The independent contractors, however, were not paid by Del-Al 
Associates—they relied completely, like Del-Al Associates, on fees paid by 
workers for their income.
R R R
$ $ $
ILMC Del Al 
Associates
oral
understanding
Independent
ContractorEmployer Worker
24 Deposition of Juan Del 
Alamo (Dec. 9, 2005), Olvera- 
Morales, et. al. vs. Int’l Labor 
Mgmt. Corp., Inc., et. al., 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27658 
(M.D.N.C. 2008).
25 Id. at 42:15–16 and 49:4–7.
Workers review information about 
their rights as H-2 workers. 
PHOTO: GRACIA CUZZI
Workers read about H-2B regulations. 
PHOTO: GRACIA CUZZI
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CASE ST UDY: GERARDO 38
Gerardo lives in a small, rural community in central 
Mexico. In late fall of 2010, he and 7 friends accepted an 
offer to work for an Oklahoma forestry company on H-2B 
visas. To secure their positions they were required to pay 
a recruiter contracted by the company over $1,500 each. 
They were promised 6 months of work at an hourly wage 
of $10.60 per hour. In addition to paying extremely high 
recruitment fees, the workers were also required to pay 
for all travel costs, bringing their total employment-related 
expenses to approximately $1,750 each.
However, when they arrived in the U.S. to begin work in 
late December, they found that instead of being paid an 
hourly wage as promised, they were paid on a piece rate 
basis. During their employment period they were paid only 
twice: $220 in early January and two weeks later they were 
paid $237.16. A total of $65 was deducted for various work 
tools. In total, Gerardo and his co-workers were each paid 
$392.26 for 121 hours of work. The resulting wage rate of 
$3.30 an hour was far below the promised wage rate. 
Had Gerardo and his coworkers maintained their 
employment with the forestry company, it would have 
taken them at least two months of work without spending 
any money on food, housing or other costs to pay off their 
inbound travel, lodging and recruitment fees. Because the 
work conditions were so poor and the pay was so low, the 
workers left their employment and returned to Mexico. They 
suffered great ﬁnancial losses and remained indebted upon 
their return to Mexico. 
CASE ST UDY: FERNANDO 39
Fernando began working with a Missouri irrigation 
company on an H-2B visa in the spring of 2010. In order 
to begin work, however, Fernando was obligated to make 
a number of payments to obtain employment, including 
recruitment fees, visa fees, and travel expenses. By the 
time he actually began employment, Fernando had already 
paid approximately $675 in order to obtain the opportunity 
to work. Federal law requires that these employer-related 
costs be reimbursed during the ﬁrst week of employment, 
up to a level where employees are paid at the Federal 
Minimum Wage.38 
During his ﬁrst week of employment, Fernando worked 
approximately 16 hours and received approximately 
$152. Considering the employment-related expenses he 
incurred before he began work, the irrigation company 
owed Fernando $640. 
In addition, Fernando was dismissed four months before 
the end of the contract because “there was not enough 
work.” Fernando paid his return travel to Mexico at a total 
of $204, yet according to federal law the employer is liable 
for return transportation if the employee is dismissed 
prior to the end of the established work period.39
In this case, the employer violated federal minimum 
wage laws and federal regulation and owed Fernando 
approximately $844.
Federal courts in two important class action suits, Arriaga v. Florida Pacific 
Farms,35 and Rivera v. Brickman Group, Ltd.,36 interpreted the law to require 
that H-2 workers be reimbursed for travel, visa, and recruitment costs incurred 
during their recruitment in some cases.
Additionally, the DOL takes the position that insofar as an H-2B employee’s 
visa, travel, and recruitment costs bring an employee’s pay below the minimum 
wage in the first week of work, the employer is responsible for paying these fees.37 
Despite this precedent, the reality is that employers rarely reimburse workers.
pre-employment costs & the effect on wages
38 See, e.g., survey number: 1568 (on file with CDM). The worker requested that 
we use a pseudonym. 
35 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002).
36 No. 05-1518, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1167 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-paed-2_05-
cv-01518/pdf/USCOURTS-
paed-2_05-cv-01518-1.pdf.
37 Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Field Assistance Bulletin 
2009-2, Travel and Visa Expenses of 
H-2B Workers Under the FLSA (Aug. 
21, 2009) available at http://www.
dol.gov/whd/FieldBulletins/Fiel-
dAssistanceBulletin2009_2.pdf.
39 See, e.g., survey number: 1310 (on file with CDM). The worker requested that 
we use a pseudonym.
40 See Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 203 et seq; U.S. Dept. of Lab. 
Wage and Hour Div. supra note 36; Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, 305 F.3d 1228 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
41 20 C.F.R. § 655.22(m) (stating that the employer is liable for return transporta-
tion if the employee is dismissed prior to the end of the established work period).
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT FEES
According to both U.S. and Mexican law, it is unlawful for 
recruiters or recruitment agencies to charge recruitment 
fees to H-2 workers.26 Nevertheless, it remains standard 
practice for recruiters to charge Mexican workers high fees 
in exchange for connecting them with employment in the 
United States.27 Fifty-eight percent of workers surveyed 
reported paying a recruitment fee.28
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS
Fees
The costs associated with recruitment vary. Some workers pay  
the recruiter a lump sum for the visa, transportation, as well 
as room and board during travel to the work site.29 Other 
workers pay each cost separately.30 Some recruiters insist that 
“visa payments” be made to their own personal bank account 
for sums greater than the actual cost of the visa.31 The lack of 
uniformity makes it difﬁcult for workers to be certain about 
which fees are permissible under the H-2 program and which 
fees are excessive or illegal.
On average, workers surveyed by CDM who worked in the 
United States in 2009 or later reported paying $590 in 
recruitment fees, not including travel, visa and other fees, to 
come to the U.S.32 Workers pay hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars in total costs for the opportunity to work seasonal jobs 
in the U.S., often earning wage rates equal to or only slightly 
greater than the legal minimum.33 Workers who reveal to the 
U.S. consulate that they have paid illegal recruitment fees risk 
being denied passage to the U.S.34
26 See supra note 23.
27 See, e.g., survey numbers: 0150 
(worker paid $2,000 in fees), 1568 
(worker paid $1,557 in fees), 1566 
(worker paid $1,409 in fees), 0035 
(worker paid $1,200 in fees), 0017 
(worker paid $1,143 in fees), 1600 
(worker paid $935 in fees), 0041 
(worker paid $850 in fees) (on file 
with CDM).
28 See supra note 2.
29 See, e.g., survey numbers:  
1290, 0085, 0098, 0105, 1553  
(on file with CDM).
30 See, e.g., surveys numbers: 
0089, 1620, 0103, 0141, 0174  
(on file with CDM). 
31 See, e.g., survey number: 0103 
(on file with CDM).
32 This statistic reflects the aver-
age amount in recruitment fees 
by surveyed workers after the DHS 
recruitment ban went into eﬀect 
on January 19, 2009.
33 See Southern Poverty Law 
Center, Beneath the Pines: Stories of 
Migrant Tree Planters (2006) at 4, 
available at http://www.immigra-
tionpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
docs/SPLCBeneaththePines.pdf. 
34 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(i)(B); 
see also 9 FAM 41.53, N2.2 Approved 
Petition Is Prima Facie Evidence 
of Entitlement to H Classification, 
Foreign Aﬀairs Manual (Oct. 5, 
2012), available at www.state.gov/
documents/organization/87226.pdf. 
CASE ST UDY: CARLOS  49
Carlos traveled from a small town in a poor region of Zacatecas  
to work for a sprinkler company in Texas from 2001–2007 to  
support his wife, several children and nephews. At the request  
of the company owner, Carlos paid the managers a $750  
“H-2B visa fee” each year, which he was told guaranteed  
him employment the following season, and received a receipt  
for this payment. In 2007, he paid the fee but was never  
brought back to work. 
Each season, Carlos took out loans at extremely high interest 
rates ranging from 10–25%. To his knowledge, these lenders were 
not authorized by the government or any other entity to give 
these loans and did not pay taxes on the money they received 
from debtors. Since these individuals are not regulated by the 
government or anyone else, they can charge whatever they want, 
often resulting in abuse.
CASE ST UDY: JORGE   50
Jorge has worked for many seasons on H-2 visas in the U.S. Every 
year that he travels to the United States to work, he borrows money 
to leave with his family to cover the family’s basic expenses until 
he can earn money to send home. Every time he travels to the U.S. 
he takes out a loan of $5,000 pesos [about $390 USD]. He borrows 
money from friends, money exchange businesses, or a Mexican 
bank that caters to low-income customers. He usually has to leave 
his voter registration identiﬁcation or the title to his truck in order 
to secure the loan. When Jorge takes out these loans for $5,000 
pesos from the bank he reports paying $800 pesos per month  
for a 10-month period for a total of $8,000 pesos, or the equivalent 
of a 60% interest rate.
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49 See, e.g., survey number: 1582 
(on file with CDM). The worker re-
quested that we use a pseudonym.
50 See, e.g., survey number: 1564 
(on file with CDM). The worker re-
quested that we use a pseudonym.
Large numbers of workers take out loans to pay for the visa, 
travel, and recruitment costs that they are assessed.42 Some 
workers take no- or low-interest loans from family members or 
friends, but others turn to local banks, private lenders, or even 
the recruiter for money to cover the costs of recruitment.43 
Interest rates on these loans range from moderate to extremely 
high, with workers reporting paying anywhere from 5% to 79% 
interest.44 In addition, local banks, lenders, and recruiters 
sometimes require workers to leave deeds to property or titles 
to automobiles as collateral.45 
These kinds of predatory lending practices leave workers 
extremely vulnerable. High interest rates on loans put workers 
at risk of becoming trapped in debt, and exploitative collateral 
requirements can cause workers to lose essential property, 
such as their vehicles or even their homes.46 Moreover, when 
workers with abusive loans arrive in the U.S. to work, they are 
faced with an additional pressure to earn back the money they 
borrowed in their country of origin.47 When these workers 
encounter abusive or unsafe working conditions, the choice 
becomes even more critical. If workers leave their employment 
in the U.S. and return home, they may have even less money 
than when they initially left to work under the H-2 visa 
program.48 The necessity to earn back borrowed money can 
force workers to continue working in dangerous or  
abusive conditions. 
47% 47% of workers surveyed reported having to take out a loan to cover pre-employment expenses.
Debt
 
42 In surveys conducted by CDM, 
47% of workers who worked 
in the U.S. on H-2 visas during 
or after the year 2006 reported 
having to take out a loan to cover 
pre-employment expenses (on file 
with CDM). 
43 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1627, 
1545 and 1309 (loans taken from 
family members and friends); 
1522, 1220, and 0163 (loans taken 
from banks); 0132, 0073, and 1577 
(loans taken from private lend-
ers)(on file with CDM); see also 
CDM and American University 
Washington College of Law, Picked 
Apart: The Hidden Struggles of 
Migrant Worker Women in the 
Maryland Crab Industry, at 15 and 
24 (2010), available at http://www.
cdmigrante.org/picked-apart-the-
hidden-struggles-of-migrant-
worker-women-in-the-maryland-
crab-industry/.
44 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1564, 
0051, 0163, 1582, 0129, 0128, 0086, 
0042, and 0133 (on file with CDM).
45 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1220, 
0086, 0109, 0125, 0129, 0130, 0132, 
0071, 1557, 1564, 1570, and 1573 (on 
file with CDM).
46 Jennifer Ludden, Corruption 
Leads to Deep Debt for Guest 
Workers, NPR, (May 8, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=10079556.
47 See CDM, supra note 43 at 
15 (2010); see also Southern 
Poverty Law Center, Close to 
Slavery: Guestworker Programs 
in the United States, at 23 (2007) 
available at: http://www.splcenter.
org/publications/close-to-slavery-
guestworker-programs-in-the-
united-states/.
48  See id.; see also National Guest-
worker Alliance and Pennsylvania 
State University, Dickinson School 
of Law’s Center for Immigrants’ 
Rights, Leveling the Playing Field: 
Reforming the H-2B Program to Pro-
tect Guestworkers and U.S. Workers, 
at 15–16 (June 2012).
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CASE ST UDY: MARISOL 57
In 2010, recruiters in a recruitment fraud 
scheme in the southern state of Tabasco 
defrauded Marisol and as many as 850 
other individuals. Marisol heard that a 
man in the neighboring town was advertis-
ing temporary visas for employment at a 
Hershey’s factory in Houston, Texas, and 
went to speak with him. She and a group 
of others each paid him $100, signed a re-
cruitment contract, and provided personal 
identiﬁcation information such as passport 
numbers and U.S. social security numbers. 
None of the workers was given a copy 
of the contract or a receipt of payment. 
The workers attended several subsequent 
meetings with the recruiters, who claimed 
that more workers were needed in New 
Jersey and Indiana. One fraud victim 
who attended these meetings described 
“streams of people” who arrived to sign 
up for visas, each paying $100 and provid-
ing her or his personal information.
Eventually, the recruiters told Marisol and 
a group of 50 workers who had paid the 
recruitment fee that they had appoint-
ments at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. 
In March, the group of workers traveled 
with one of the recruiters to Mexico City, 
where they each paid the recruiter $16 
for their hotel accommodations and $112 
for what they were told was the visa fee. 
Another recruiter arrived at the hotel and 
charged each worker $20 to help him or 
her ﬁll out his or her visa application.
The following day, Marisol and the other 
workers went to the U.S. Embassy and dis-
covered that they did not have appoint-
ments for visa interviews. The recruiters 
disappeared overnight. Marisol had taken 
out a loan of approximately $800 to cover 
these fees. Without employment in the 
US, she was left with no means through 
which to make her loan payments. In 
total, the recruiters made approximately 
$92,500 through their visa scam.
MISREPRESENTATIONS BY BONA FIDE RECRUITERS
Recruiters can also be guilty of committing fraud.  Because re-
cruiters are rarely held accountable for their activities in either 
the United States or in Mexico, they sometimes misrepresent 
terms of employment in order to attract more workers and 
charge higher recruitment fees.54 Sometimes recruiters prom-
ise higher wages, greater or fewer hours, or more optimistic 
job descriptions than the employer actually has to offer.55 Some 
workers surveyed also reported that recruiters lied to them 
about the industry in which they would work.56 
Workers, who have no way to verify the promises made by the 
recruiter, accept these offers and ﬁnd a completely different 
employment reality when they arrive in the U.S. Further, since 
the workers are rarely provided with a written contract setting 
out the terms of their employment, it is difﬁcult for them to 
take any legal action to hold the recruiters or employers liable 
for failing to uphold the terms of the agreement under which 
they were lured to the U.S. Workers may have accepted one 
job offer with a promised wage rate of $11.50 per hour only to 
ﬁnd themselves working in an entirely different industry for the 
federal minimum wage, currently $7.25 per hour.  
1 out of 10 workers 
surveyed reported 
paying a fee for a  
non-existent job.
Fraud
 
The lack of transparency in the visa certiﬁcation process,  
paucity of government oversight of recruitment activities, and  
scarcity of information available to workers about their rights 
puts workers—and even whole communities—at serious risk 
for recruitment fraud across Mexico. Persons purporting to be 
recruiters, bona ﬁde recruiters, and employers may commit 
recruitment fraud.
SCAM ARTISTS POSING AS RECRUITERS
One way in which recruitment fraud occurs is when alleged 
recruiters arrive in a community, offer work under the H-2 
program that does not actually exist, charge a service fee, and 
then disappear without a trace.51 This is often referred to as 
“recruitment fraud” because the individuals who carry out 
these schemes hold themselves out to be recruiters, but in 
many cases are scam artists who steal money by offering false 
promises of employment.
Fraudulent recruiters organize town meetings to present  
their false work opportunities during which dozens or hundreds 
of workers attend and pay fees.52 These individuals do not have 
real employment opportunities or contracts to offer workers.  
When presented with employment offers by unknown individuals, 
workers have virtually no means to verify the legitimacy of the 
recruiter or the employment offer because there is no recruiter 
registry for workers to check and no existing comprehensive 
job bank that workers can access to determine the legitimacy 
of the supposed offer.
Even if the alleged recruiter speciﬁes the company with whom 
the workers are to be employed, workers do not know if the 
company is even hiring workers under H-2 visas. For many 
workers, the urgent need for stable employment outweighs the 
risks, obligating them to accept work offers even with no means 
of verifying their legitimacy. Thus, scam artists take advantage 
of the workers’ desire to work in the United States and, some-
times, desperation to provide for their families. Inevitably, many 
migrant workers are caught in recruitment fraud schemes and 
lose hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars with no effective 
system in place to help them track down or report the thieves 
who have stolen their money. This type of recruitment abuse 
can have devastating consequences for small communities.
CASE ST UDY: ELIZARDO 53
In 2007, a recruiter offered Elizardo and 
several dozen other workers from the 
state of Zacatecas employment in the 
construction industry with H-2B visas. 
The recruiter promised Elizardo and the 
others that they would be paid $15.00 per 
hour. The Zacatecas state employment 
agency conﬁrmed this arrangement 
and indicated that the workers would 
be traveling to California. Based on this 
information, the workers deposited 
over $200 for the recruitment fee into a 
Mexican bank account. When the group 
arrived in Monterrey, the Zacatecas 
state employment agency representative 
informed the workers that the terms of 
their employment—including where they 
were to work and the type of work they 
were to perform—had been changed. 
They were informed that the employment 
available to them was actually work with 
the Georgia-based carnival company 
Geren Rides and that they would be paid 
$250 per week.
51 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1545, 
1522, 0094, 0118, and 0155 (on file 
with CDM.)
52 See, e.g., survey numbers: 
0190, 0186, 1397, and 0175 (on file 
with CDM). 
53  Survey number: 0103; see also 
Rosales, et. al. v. Geren Rides, No. 
1:2009-cv-01390 (N.D. Ga. filed 
May 22, 2009).
52%
52% of workers surveyed 
reported that they were never 
shown a written work contract.
57 Survey number: 0186 (on file with CDM). The worker 
requested that we use a pseudonym.
54 Steven Greenhouse, Low Pay 
and Broken Promises Greet Guest 
Workers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2007, 
available at: http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/02/28/us/28labor.html.
55 See, e.g., survey numbers: 
0090, 0095, 0107, 0121, and 0071 
(on file with CDM). 
56 See, e.g., survey numbers: 1568 
and 0055 (on file with CDM). 
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workers to trafﬁcking stems, in part, from a lack of oversight 
and enforcement in the program and insufﬁcient worker 
protections in the regulatory framework.
H-2 workers may fall victim to human trafﬁcking when their 
employers or recruiters: 
ï lie to H-2 workers or to the U.S. government about the 
worker’s rate of pay; 
ïpromise H-2 workers or the U.S. government that they will 
provide working conditions that are never provided;
ïcharge H-2 workers unlawful fees or fail to reimburse them 
for costs like visa fees and travel to the US;
ïconﬁscate workers’ passports and other important 
identiﬁcation or migration documents;69 
ïphysically conﬁne workers to their place of work;
ïthreaten workers with deportation if they do not work or 
perform certain tasks.
These acts constitute trafﬁcking under U.S. law when they 
amount to (1) a scheme, plan, or pattern that is intended to 
cause workers to believe that if they do not perform labor they 
or someone else will suffer harm or (2) an abuse or threatened 
abuse of law or the legal process.70 U.S. courts are required 
to take into account a victim’s “special vulnerabilities” when 
evaluating degrees of coercion in cases of possible human 
trafﬁcking.71 In the context of the H-2 programs, temporary 
workers face a power disparity in relation to their employers 
and recruiters that makes them particularly susceptible to 
involuntary servitude and forced labor.
Trafﬁcked workers are often isolated, working in rural communi-
ties or for transient employers, making it extremely difﬁcult for 
law enforcement and immigration authorities to identify these 
trafﬁcking victims and to take action against the trafﬁckers.
CASE ST UDY: SAMUEL  72
When a recruiter came to Manuel’s small 
town in Durango, a central-northern state 
in Mexico, offering job contracts in the 
U.S. as food vendors for an hourly wage of 
$10.71/hour, he jumped at the opportunity. 
But what he found upon arriving in New 
York to work at Peter’s Fine Greek Food 
in 2010 was something far different than 
what he was promised. Samuel and 18 
other workers on H-2B workers reported 
working 16 to 18 hour shifts at a wage 
rate of $1 per hour. In addition, they had 
limited access to food and were forced to 
sleep in bug-infested trailers. As a result of 
these unsafe working and living conditions, 
workers became ill and had to visit the 
local emergency room. Threats of violating 
their visas and being deported kept the 
men working in these conditions. Federal 
authorities brought trafﬁcking charges 
against the employer, but the charges 
were later dropped after parties arrived at 
a monetary settlement.
tribute to a situation of debt 
bondage. This is the case even 
when the worker’s status in the 
country is tied to the employer 
as a guestworker in the context 
of employment-based tempo-
rary work programs.”), http://
www.state.gov/documents/
organization/142979.pdf.
66 See 22 U. S. C. § 7102(5) (de-
fining involuntary servitude 
as “a condition of servitude 
induced by means of (1) any 
scheme, plan, or pattern 
intended to cause a person to 
believe that, if the person did 
not perform such labor or ser-
vices, that person or another 
person would suﬀer serious 
harm or physical restraint; or 
(2) abuse or threatened abuse 
of law or the legal process.”); 
See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(a)
(1-2)(defining forced labor to 
include “force, threats of force, 
physical restraint, or threats 
of physical restraint to that 
person or another person” and 
“serious harm or threats of 
serious harm to that person or 
another person”). 
67 Id.
68 U.S. v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 
145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 
United States v. Calimlim, 538 
F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2008); 
See also Shukla v. Sharma, 2009 
US Dist. LEXIS 90044, *33 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009).
69 U.S. v. Sabhnani, 599 
F.3d 215, 245 (2d Cir. 2010) (a 
person may be liable for know-
ingly destroying, concealing, 
removing, confiscating, or 
possessing any actual or 
purported passport or other 
immigration document, or 
any other actual or purported 
government identification 
document, of another person 
either in the course of a viola-
tion of one of a number of 
statutes, including the forced 
labor and peonage statutes, or 
with the intent to violate the 
same statutes, or for know-
ingly concealing immigration 
documents with intent to 
violate the forced labor or 
peonage statutes).
70 Traﬃcking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act, supra 
note 64.
71 U.S. v. Bradley, 390 F. 3d 145, 
153.
72    See Marnie Eisenstadt, State Fair Vendor Abused Work-
ers, The Post Standard (April 19, 2011), http://www.syracuse.
com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/vendor_abused_mexican_
workers.html
DECREASED LIKELIHOOD OF REPORTING ABUSES
Several systemic ﬂaws in the recruitment process reduce the 
likelihood that workers report abuses they suffer in their places 
of employment. Given the high costs that most workers pay 
in order to obtain employment under the H-2 program, many 
arrive in the U.S. indebted. Consequently, workers face acute 
pressure to work in order to pay back loans, often laboring 
under conditions that citizens would reject.
H-2 workers are further discouraged from protesting abusive 
working conditions because their legal status in the U.S. is tied 
to their employment with the single, designated employer that 
sponsored their visas.58 Reporting illegal labor practices means 
risking dismissal and losing legal status in the U.S.—perhaps the 
only opportunity to pay back loans or support a family.59 In light 
of the risks, workers often choose to continue working without 
complaining.60
Finally, many H-2 workers rely on seasonal work in the U.S. 
for their principle income, travelling to the U.S. on a yearly 
basis in order to support their families.61 Reporting abuses or 
even speaking up in their workplace about basic rights could 
endanger their chances of being rehired by their employer. 
Although retaliation against workers for ﬁling a complaint or 
inquiring into their workplace rights is illegal, it is common 
practice among H-2 employers and their agents.62 Recruiters 
have been known to maintain “blacklists” of workers who are 
outspoken against mistreatment.63
H-2 WORKERS ARE VULNERABLE TO TRAFFICKING
The current guestworker recruitment system makes workers 
vulnerable to human trafﬁcking. Trafﬁcking is any type of 
involuntary servitude or forced labor affecting men or women.64 
The U.S. Department of State recognizes debt bondage among 
migrant laborers as a form of human trafﬁcking.65
The H-2 program has produced situations of involuntary 
servitude and forced labor, both forms of human trafﬁcking 
under the Trafﬁcking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act.66 
H-2 workers may ﬁnd themselves in situations of involuntary 
servitude or forced labor in which they are coerced to work.67 
Courts have interpreted “coercion” broadly, including “subtle 
psychological methods of coercion.”68 The vulnerability of H-2 
Consequences 58 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.35 (explaining that the employer 
must inform the worker that 
she must depart at the end of 
her contract or the DHS grace 
period, whichever is earlier, 
absent an extension.); see 
also 20 C.F.R. §655.22(f) 
(“Upon the separation 
from employment of H–2B 
worker(s) employed under the 
labor certification application, 
if such separation occurs 
prior to the end date of the 
employment specified in the 
application, the employer 
will notify the Department 
and DHS in writing of the 
separation from employment 
not later than 2 work days after 
such separation is discovered 
by the employer.”) But see 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(D). In 
order for an H-2B worker to 
change employers, her new 
employer must file an I-129 
and USCIS must approve 
the new petition. Practically 
speaking, the new employer 
must therefore establish all 
the requirements that the 
original petitioning employer 
did. Until the petition is 
approved, the H-2B worker 
may not begin work. The 2012 
DOL H-2B regulations are 
currently stayed due to a tem-
porary injunction issued by 
a federal district court in the 
Northern District of Florida 
in Bayou Lawn & Landscape 
Services, et al. v. Hilda Solis, et 
al. (3:12-CV-00183-MCR-CJK). 
59 Id.
60 See Farm Labor Working 
Organizing Committee, A 
State of Fear: Human Rights 
Abuses in North Carolina’s 
Tobacco Industry 38, 46 (2011). 
See also United States General 
Accounting Oﬃce, H-2A Agri-
cultural Guestworker Program: 
Changes Could Improve Services 
to Employers and Better Protect 
Workers at 68 (1997); see also 
Farmworker Justice, Litany of 
Abuses at 8 (2008); Colorado 
Legal Services, Overworked 
and Underpaid: H-2A Herders 
in Colorado at 23 (2010); supra 
note 43, at 31.
61 Many of CDM’s clients 
have worked multiple seasons 
in the U.S. on H-2 visas, often 
with the same employer. 
Employers usually maintain 
lists of preferred workers that 
they provide to their recruiting 
agent each year. See Juan Del 
Alamo Dep. supra note 24 
at 15:16-22; see also Juan Del 
Alamo Dep. 69: 8-9 (January 
23, 2007), Olvera-Morales, et. 
al. v. Int’l Labor Mgmt Corp., et. 
al., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27658 
(M.D.N.C. 2008); Deposition 
of Elizabeth Whitley 51:13-15 
(January 11, 2007), Rivera et 
al. v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., No. 2: 
05-cv-01518 (E.D. PA filed on 
April 1, 2005); Deposition of 
Daniel Bremer 17:25-18:1 (June 
2, 2010), Perez-Benites, et. al. v. 
Candy Brand, LLC., et. al., No. 
1:07-cv-1048 (W.D. AK filed on 
June 7, 2007); Deposition of 
Ricardo Rodriguez, Jr. 44:6-9 
(May 19, 2010), Perez-Benites, 
et. al. v. Candy Brand, LLC., et. 
al., No. 1:07-cv-1048 (W.D. AK 
filed on June 7, 2007).
62 See, e.g., U.S. National 
Labor Relations Board 
Charge Against TexaScapes 
Landscaping (July 14, 2008) 
(on file with CDM) (describ-
ing the retaliation charge 
leveled against employer by 
four H-2B workers who alleged 
they were threatened with 
discharge for participating in a 
protected, concerted activity). 
The NLRB issued a complaint 
against TexaScapes, which 
resulted in a favorable settle-
ment for the four workers, 
who had united in protest 
against a lack of breaks while 
working in the summer heat.
63 See, e.g., survey numbers: 
1548, 1309, 0080, 0081, 0082, 
0083, 0086, 0111, 0137, 0140, 
0141, 0145, 0171, 0050, 0054, 
0072, 0076, 0077, 0078, 0079, 
1574, 1565, 1598, and 1670 (on 
file with CDM).
64 Traﬃcking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act of 
2003, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2004). 
65 See U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Traﬃcking in Persons Report 
(2010) (“the attribution of il-
legal costs and debts on these 
laborers in the source country, 
often with the support of labor 
agencies and employers in the 
destination country, can con-
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A worker displays his H-2 visa. 
PHOTO: GRACIA CUZZI
Inadequate Regulations and 
Insufﬁcient Enforcement
73 See changes to Requirements 
Aﬀecting H-2B Nonimmigrants 
and Their Employers, 73 Fed. Reg. 
78, 104, 78, 125 (Dec. 19, 2008), 73 
Fed. Reg. 78,037, 78,113 (Dec. 19, 
2008) (explaining limitations on 
DHS and DOL authority to regulate 
recruiters in a foreign country); 
see also Olvera-Morales v. Sterling 
Onions, 322 F. Supp. 211 (N.D.N.Y. 
2004) (denying the hiring agency’s 
motion to dismiss alien’s employ-
ment discrimination action 
based on gender, where agency 
reserved H-2A visa positions, 
which provide better pay and 
benefits, for men). But see Reyes-
Gaona v. NCGA, 250 F.3d 86 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”) did not apply to a 
Mexican national who applied 
in Mexico for a job in the United 
States). 
74 See supra note 23.
75 See supra notes 1 and 10. 
By subcontracting the recruitment process to third-party 
actors, U.S. employers do more than simply circumvent 
the logistical hassle of locating workers outside of the U.S. 
Employers may use the complicated recruitment supply chain  
to wash their hands of recruitment abuse, claiming ignorance  
of recruitment practices. The complex, multi-party rela-
tion ships between employers and layers of subcontracted 
recruiters mean that the U.S. employer may not have contact 
with or even know about the individual that ultimately locates 
workers in Mexico. Recruiter-recruiter partnerships may 
leave no contract or payment history, which obscures the 
recruitment supply chain.
The complex, often informal nature of the recruitment supply 
chain is further complicated by the international nature 
of the dealings. Partnerships between U.S. employers and 
recruiters operating in Mexico limit the legal channels available 
to migrant workers and their advocates to seek redress for 
recruitment abuse. Although U.S. law prohibits certain activities 
like discrimination and retaliation by employers, passport 
conﬁscation, and charging visa, travel, or placement fees to 
workers, the responsible U.S. government agencies also claim 
they are unable to apply this law when those practices are 
committed outside U.S. territory.73 Mexican law also prohibits 
many of these practices, but the Mexican government rarely 
intervenes in the recruitment of Mexican workers under the 
H-2 visa programs.74 
The U.S. government’s failure to comprehensively monitor, 
regulate, or document the recruitment phase of the H-2 visa 
programs has meant that there is little information about  
recruiters and the recruitment industry available to re-
searchers, advocates, U.S. employers who wish to comply  
with the law, or workers themselves. Because data about 
the H-2 programs is collected by various agencies, not 
standardized, and maintained in various locations instead of 
a single, centralized location, the little information that is 
available to the public is often difﬁcult to access, conﬂicting, 
or incomplete.75 Without comprehensive, accessible data about 
the diverse actors involved in the H-2 visa programs, workers, 
advocates, and well-meaning employers are severely limited 
in their ability to inform themselves about the recruitment 
industry or vet recruitment agencies.
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The U.S. Congress should overhaul the H-2 
guestworker programs to protect workers from 
recruitment abuse in their countries of origin. 
Speciﬁcally, Congress should:
ïEnact legislation to hold employers strictly liable 
for all recruitment fees charged to workers.
ïExtend federally funded legal services to  
all H-2 workers.74
ïCreate a public recruiter registry to increase 
transparency in the recruitment process.
ïAmend applicable anti-discrimination laws to 
clearly articulate the available protections  
for internationally recruited workers, both during 
the recruitment process and while employed  
in the U.S.
ïEnact retaliation protections for workers who 
report recruitment abuse.
ïRequire that all job orders be treated as 
enforceable contracts. 
The U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of 
State, the National Labor Relations Board, and the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
should coordinate to:
ïForbid the charging of recruitment fees by 
U.S. employers, their agents, or associates or 
subcontractors of the employer’s agents and 
investigate the charging of illegal fees.
ïVigorously investigate and litigate claims of 
abuse and discrimination against H-2 workers, 
even after workers have returned to their 
countries of origin at the expiration of their 
work visas.
ïDefer action or grant other immigration relief  
to H-2 whistleblowers still in the U.S. so 
that they can stay in the country to aid in 
the investigation and prosecution of their 
employers, and issue short-term visas to 
workers who have already left the U.S. so  
that they can return to participate.
ïPublish information about H-2 employer 
petitioners in searchable form on the Internet, 
including information on the recruiters that  
they used.
ïProvide pre-departure and post-arrival 
orientation upon arrival for temporary workers, 
including written and oral Know-Your-Rights 
trainings and contact information for available 
legal services.
ïCreate an expedited investigation process for 
H-2 workers to ensure that all witness testimony 
and evidence is preserved given the temporary 
nature of their visas. 
74 Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
§ 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1350 § 504(a)
(11)(1996) (listing the categories 
of non-citizens who may receive 
LSC services, but not including 
H-2B workers); Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-161, § 540, 121 Stat. 
1844, 1934 § 504(a)(11)(E) (2008) 
(granting LSC-funded nonprofit 
legal aid programs the ability to 
assist H-2B forestry workers). 
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The U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. 
Department of Labor, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the 
National Labor Relations Board and other federal agencies should 
coordinate to protect internationally recruited workers’ interests. 
Further, the U.S. government should work in concert with the 
Mexican government and other foreign governments to ensure that 
H-2 workers from their countries are protected.
Finally, the U.S. government should work in collaboration with 
migrant advocacy organizations to ensure that worker experiences 
are reﬂected in reform efforts, that investigations into worker 
abuses are expediently investigated and remedied and that 
unscrupulous recruiters and employers are held accountable for 
their actions.
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Conclusion
Each year more than one hundred thousand workers are 
affected by the ﬂawed H-2 programs’ recruitment  
system. These workers are often lured to the U.S. by lies 
and charged illegal recruitment fees and high interest on 
their loans. Many would-be workers are also defrauded 
wreaking economic harm in home communities. The 
system is broken. The U.S. government must address the 
failed recruitment system before expanding the H-2 visa 
programs. Failing to address recruitment ﬂaws will result 
in continued abuse and exploitation of workers during 
recruitment, in migration, and while they are employed 
in the U.S. In order to protect these workers, the U.S. 
government must create a transparent and accountable 
recruitment system. Once this system is established,  
the government must enforce the protections. Only then 
will these workers stand a chance of avoiding abuse  
while working in the U.S. with H-2 visas. 
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The U.S. Department of Labor should:
ïRequire through regulations that employers 
reimburse workers for all visa and travel costs 
during the ﬁrst week of work.
ïRequire all Temporary Labor Certiﬁcations  
to include an hourly wage rate. 
ïForbid non-end-beneﬁciary employers  
(i.e. stafﬁng agencies) from petitioning for  
H-2 workers.
ïRequire that all job orders be enforceable 
contracts.
ïCreate a public recruiter registry. As a 
requirement for entry in the registry, recruiter 
agents would supply the Department of Labor 
with yearly activity reports. Yearly reports 
would include: contact information, including all 
branch ofﬁces, a list of other recruiter agents 
with whom they collaborated, a list of employers 
with whom they placed workers, a description 
of services offered, and a list of regions from 
where they recruited (if they have direct contact 
with workers in their home countries). Recruiter 
agents would be required to participate in 
random audits.
ïRequire that employers use only recruiters 
registered in the public recruiter registry and 
that they identify their recruiter(s) on their 
H-2 petitions. If a random audit found that an 
employer failed to list a recruiter agent, a ﬁne 
would be applied to the employer. If subsequent 
audits found that the employer consistently 
failed to adhere to this requirement, the 
Department of Labor would suspend the 
employer from petitioning for Temporary Labor 
Certiﬁcations.
ïPublish a list of employers who have violated 
recruitment and/or labor regulations.
ïRequire U.S. employers to ﬁle end-of-year  
reports (including documentation of 
reimbursement of travel and visa expenses 
incurred by workers) on their participation  
in the H-2 program. 
ïConduct random audits of workplaces that 
employ H-2 workers.
ïCreate a speciﬁc hotline for workers on  
H-2 visas, available in Spanish and English.
ïBroaden U-visa certiﬁcation to include workers 
who have suffered labor recruitment abuses  
and have returned to Mexico at the expiration  
of their work visas.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security should:
ïStreamline the humanitarian parole process  
to facilitate participation of H-2 workers in 
civil and criminal actions against recruiters and 
employers for rights violations.
ïCreate clear consular processing guidelines for 
individuals eligible for U-visas.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission should:
ïPublish guidance on the coverage of 
internationally recruited workers by Title VII, 
ADEA, ADA and all other applicable laws.
ïCreate a targeted outreach plan aimed at 
educating H-2 and other internationally 
recruited workers about their rights against 
discrimination.
ïSign U-visa certiﬁcations for eligible workers.
* Additional recommendations available from the author.
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